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Introduction 
Indonesia is now facing the important moment of constructing a new foundation in a 
transitional period. After the fall of the New Order regime, there have been efforts in bringing 
Indonesia through the period of ‘transition to democracy’. One of the efforts is to reform the 1945 
Constitution.  
Until now, the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, 
‘MPR’) has promulgated three amendments consisting of 103 new/amended provisions. From the 
fact that there are three amendments, one may form the opinion that the reform started in 1998 
has been going well in terms of constitutional reform.  
There are, however, certain issues beyond the quantity of the articles and the ‘legality’ of 
the process. Can the amended articles meet the need of democratisation? What are the 
implications of the inserted new articles to human rights and the political system? Has civil 
society genuinely participated in the process? Having reviewed the way in which the MPR 
performed the process, does the MPR have full legitimacy to reform the constitution?  
I will address the issues while referring to human rights provisions in the constitution. In 
addition, because I am here in my capacity as an NGO personnel who has been involved closely 
with the civil society movement advocating a ‘New Constitution through Constitution 
Commission,’ I will also particularly elaborate that issue in outlining the present state of 
constitutional debate in Indonesia. It is that capacity too, that places me in the position of merely 
describing what is happening in Indonesia, and not analysing it from the theoretical point of 
view. 
I. Brief Review on the Amendments of the 1945 Constitution 
The 1945 Constitution was drafted before Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945 
and promulgated a day after the independence. It therefore reflected the need of the society at 
that time, which was the need to have a new independent government to establish an 
independent country. Therefore, there were only 37 articles concerning basic provisions for a 
newly established country. As the annotation reads:  
 
‘The Constitution is made up of only 37 articles. The clauses merely refer to transitional 
and additional aspects…. 
It is adequate if the constitution only contains the fundamental provisions and guidelines 
as directives for the government and other state institutions to conduct state affairs and 
create public welfare. In particular for a new and young country, such a basic law is best 
to contain the basic provisions only while the operational procedures can be 
accommodated in laws, which are easier to make, amend and repeal. Hence the system in 
which the constitution is drafted.’ 
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All of the ‘founding parents’ realised, so that it is stated clearly in the text, that the 
Constitution was meant to be a temporary constitution and it should be replaced by a 
comprehensive and definitive constitution after the transition from a colonial state to an 
independent one was completed and peace and stability were achieved (Article 3, Additional 
Provisions, and the Annotations of the 1945 Constitution).  
In a legal-formal perspective, however, the 1945 Constitution is definitive, since it was 
promulgated as a definitive one in 1959 by a Presidential Decree (in Soekarno’s administration, 
known as ‘Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959’) when the Konstituante (Constitutional Body that was 
assigned by the 1950 Constitution to draft a definitive constitution) considered to have failed in 
its task.1 
Although the 1945 Constitution is legally binding, the fact that it was made as a 
temporary constitution, which has limited provisions, leads to the question whether it is still 
sufficient for the present situation. Since it was meant to be a temporary constitution, the content 
is rather simple and open to multiple interpretations; this is the major weakness of the 1945 
Constitution. The basic content of a constitution, which consists of human rights, the division and 
limitation of power, and the manifestation of state based on the rule of law, were not sufficiently 
accommodated in it. 
Due to the nature of its suitability for those who wanted to abuse and maintain their power 
at the same time, the 1945 Constitution was treated as a ‘sacred document’ during the New Order 
era. Then, as the movement to overthrow the New Order regime reached its peak in 1998, the 
demand to reform the constitution received a response from the ‘new’ MPR resulting from the 
first general election after the New Order regime.2  
There have been three amendments afterwards. The first was in 1999, the second was in 
2000 and the third amendment has just been ratified in November 2001. 
There are two criticisms articulated by the Civil Society Organisations of the 
amendments. The first criticism is regarding substance. Even though there have already been 
three amendments (and will be followed by a fourth next year), there was no clear paradigm on 
which the amendment should be based. Thus, the provisions are not coherent.  
The limitation of presidential power, for example, was the first thing that was enacted in 
1999, mainly motivated by the ‘bad experience’ of the excessive power of the president during 
New Order and Guided Democracy regimes. Yet the MPR has not really decided what type of 
system of government the Constitution should be based on. As a result, there is no clarity in the 
pattern of interaction between the president and the parliament. In practice, it is difficult to 
determine whether Indonesia applies a presidential system, parliamentary system, or even a 
mixed system of government. Therefore, it is wide open for interpretation from whoever has 
special interests. One of the most obvious results of the lack of clarity was the conflict between 
the parliament and the president months ago that has ended in impeachment of the president. 
Despite of the fact that there was a strong political conflict behind this case, an endless debate 
among the constitutional lawyers during the process strongly indicated the problems.  
                                                 
1 It should be noted that there is a strong argument stating that Konstituante almost finished its duty when the Presidential Decree was enacted. 
Yet, because of the political reasons, the President issued the Decree. See Adnan Buyung Nasution, The aspiration for constitutional government 
in Indonesia : a socio-legal study of the Indonesian konstituante 1956-1959 (1992). 
 
2 MPR consists of 695 members, 500 members are at the same time the members of DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People’s Representatives or 
the Parliament), 130 members are the representatives of provinces elected by the local parliament, and 65 members are representatives of Societal 
Groups appointed by the Election Committee. Among the 500 members of DPR, 38 seats are allocated for the Military and the Police Force 
(Police Force in Indonesia is part of the Military Forces) and the rest were elected through the general election in 1999. It has authority to (1) elect 
the President and Vice President; (2) amend the Constitution; and (3) enact a General Guidelines for State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara) 
every five years. 
 2
Page 3 of 8 
The second critique regards the process, which includes the limited time spent in the 
deliberation process and the lack of public participation. MPR members are divided into three 
Ad-Hoc Committees; one of them (Ad-Hoc Committee I or Panitia Ad-Hoc I in Bahasa 
Indonesia, ‘PAH I’) is assigned in particular to prepare the draft of amendments. PAH I worked 
for approximately nine months before the draft was submitted to the Annual Session of MPR. 
However, during the session, before it is ratified in a plenary session, the draft will be discussed 
by a new commission (Commission A) which consists of different persons (200 members). This 
Commission will discuss the whole draft all over again within five days. As a result, particularly 
in the second amendment, the full draft that has been prepared by PAH I was not enacted, rather, 
only certain articles that are considered ‘safe’ for every faction’s interests were enacted. 
As for the people’s participation, although MPR did conduct a series of seminars in 
different provinces, they were not involving civil society very much. Whereas the CSOs demand 
the participation of civil society in the broader term, only academics, government apparatus, local 
parliament members, and certain organisations (usually those related to political parties) were 
invited to the seminars. 
It is true that every discussion of PAH I preparing the draft amendment was open to the 
public and broadcast through cable television for people in Jakarta. Nevertheless, at the end of 
the day, many of the final decisions were made during the five days of Annual Sessions and, 
because five days with 200 persons involved was not enough, there were many lobbying sessions 
and discussions done beyond the public eye after the sessions. Therefore, it was almost 
impossible for the public to really know which articles were going to be ratified at the end of the 
session.  
Based on those critiques, the CSOs are now questioning the ‘legitimacy’ of MPR to 
conduct the task of reforming the Constitution. Furthermore, although the 1999 general election 
was considered the first democratic one since 1955 by monitoring groups, the representation in 
the MPR is still problematic. There are still appointed members, especially the Military faction, 
that are not considered as the people’s ‘real representatives’; and there is also the lack of 
‘communication’ between the MPR members and their constituents. This subject will be 
discussed further in the third part of this paper. 
II. Constitutional Provisions Regarding Human Rights 
Now I come to the part that is the important theme of this conference, which is the human 
rights issue. 
The original text of the 1945 Constitution only contains six provisions that explicitly talk 
about human rights with 15 Human Rights Principles included.3 Human rights provisions in the 
1945 Constitution are also problematic because there were too many further regulations delegated 
to laws/statutes. Thus, they could be easily ‘twisted’ according to those in power. For instance, 
there was a law regarding mass organisation (Law No. 8 year 1985) imposing ‘Pancasila’ as the 
only principle for every organisation as a further regulatory provision of ‘the right to 
organisation’ provided in Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution. Without having ‘Pancasila’ as its 
principle, a group was not allowed to establish an organisation.  
I am pretty sure that all participants of this conference have been aware that human rights 
issue were indeed one of the most important concerns in the reform process. There was a national 
action plan regarding human rights announced in 1998 during President Habibie’s government, 
which was planned to finish in 2003. The MPR also immediately responded to the concern by 
                                                 
3 See Todung Mulya Lubis, In Search of Human Rights: Legal-Political Dilemmas of Indonesia’s New Order, 1966-1990 (1994).  
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promulgating an MPR Decree No.XVII/MPR/1998 regarding Human Rights. The next MPR (the 
‘new’ one) then ‘modified’ and inserted articles in the MPR Decree as parts of the second 
amendment in 2000.  
These articles, however, need to be analysed further as to whether or not they are 
appropriate in protecting human rights. The most controversial article is article 28I section (1) 
that says: 
The rights to life, freedom from torture, freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of 
religion, freedom from enslavement, recognition as a person before the law, and the right 
not to be tried under a law with retrospective effect are all human rights that cannot be 
limited under any circumstances. 
 
With this provision, it would be impossible to prosecute those responsible for human 
rights crimes during the New Order that are not considered crimes under the prevailing Criminal 
Code, such as crimes against humanity and genocide. As Indonesia applies a civil law system and 
has a legislative hierarchy, no act may contravene the Constitution, and this could have affected 
the Law on Human Rights Tribunal that was drafted at the time the article was inserted into 
Constitution.  
It is correct that the non-retroactive principle is universally acknowledged. Nonetheless, 
there is also an exception of this principle for the gross violation of human rights, as the practice 
of international law has applied this exception to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Cases in 1946 and 
1948 for war crimes during the Second World War.  
Prof. Muladi, the former Minister of Justice and Human Rights and an expert in Criminal 
Law said ‘although non-retroactivity is a general principle of the law, it would be better not to 
include it in the Constitution’.4 
Opinions concerning this article were also stated by Prof. Suwoto Mulyosudarmo, a 
constitutional law expert and Prof. Bagir Manan, a constitutional law expert and Chief Justice. As 
Prof. Mulyosudarmo put it: ‘To avoid further problems, the article should be revoked in the next 
amendment’.5  
Apparently, however, since the human rights activists and experts strongly opposed this 
principle and advocated bringing the human rights violators into court, the DPR then ratified the 
Law on Human Rights Tribunal (Law No. 26 year 2000)6 that put aside the non-retroactive 
principle for gross violation of human rights. The government and DPR agreed that gross 
violation of human rights in the past should be put under the jurisdiction of the Law on Human 
Rights Tribunal, but that the settlement should be done by the establishment of an Ad-Hoc 
Tribunal of Human Rights with consideration to the time and place of the violations (tempus 
delicti and locus delicti). 
To conclude this case, apart from the fact that it is not proper to put such a principle in a 
constitution, it should be said that it is peculiar to have one principle in the Constitution while 
there is a law that actually opposes the principle, especially for a country that applies a civil law 
system with stricter hierarchy of legislation.7 The question is then, if the government and DPR 
                                                 
4 http://www.etan.org/et2000c/september/17-23/21ethuma.htm (cited 24 November 2001).  
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 There is also Law regarding Human Rights, Law No. 39 year 1999. 
 
7 Because there is MPR Decree No. III Year 2000 on the Source of Law and Hierarchy of Legislation, in which the law and other regulations 
should be based on the Constitution. 
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were able to agree not to recognise this particular principle in the Human Rights Tribunal Law, 
why did MPR put this principle in the Constitution in the first place? Bearing in mind that almost 
three quarters of MPR members are DPR members and they were supported by experts as well as 
watched by Human Rights CSOs, how could this ‘politically heavy’ principle pass? 
Subsequently, should the amended constitution be ‘re-amended’? Or should the law be amended 
according to the constitution and thus, let the violators of human rights escape from national trial 
and/or be tried in the International Tribunal of Human Rights?  
I need to add here that there is very strong indication of strong political pressure behind 
the ratification of this particular provision. This indication resulted from the fact that this specific 
provision was not endorsed during the formal session; it was a result of a lobbying session among 
the faction leaders after the formal one. 
III. Present Constitutional Debate 
The aforementioned debates regarding critiques from CSOs towards the amendments as 
well as the case of the non-retroactive principle in the Human Rights provision lead to the 
discussion on present constitutional debate in Indonesia. 
At present, there is a civil movement led by CSOs/NGOs advocating the making of a new 
constitution through a deliberative process involving as many members of society as possible. 
This movement also particularly advocates the establishment of a Constitution Commission 
similar to those in Thailand, South Africa, and the Philippines. This demand is based on the 
following reasons: 
1. The societal context within the 1945 Constitution is not relevant anymore within the 
present situation. Indonesian society needs sufficient provisions regarding human rights 
and governance so as to limit power and be in line with the present societal state. For 
instance, it needs provisions that can address wealth distribution among the regions, as 
development has been centred only in Java island, and Jakarta in particular. 
2. The way the MPR amended the 1945 Constitution resulted in a vague system. The 
people argue that they need a coherent constitution that cannot be interpreted by those in 
power for their own political interests. 
3. There must be participation from as many people as possible, because ultimately the 
Constitution will affect all people and it is believed that people’s participation is an 
important key in having a constitution that reflects the real need of the society. Moreover, 
it is likely that such involvement can channel the potential conflicts within the society. 
 
This group has been conducting a series of discussions in many regions, media advocacy, 
lobbying sessions, and establishing a network among those supportive to this proposal.  
This recommendation became a national issue when President Megawati Soekarnoputri 
mentioned the possibility, in the president’s annual speech in 18 August 2001, of setting up a 
Constitution Commission to reform the Constitution.  
The opponents of this recommendation, mainly MPR members, claim that MPR has full 
legitimacy to reform the Constitution based on the Constitution itself, therefore establishing a 
Constitution Commission is a violation of the Constitution. They also say that their legitimacy 
cannot be questioned as the current members of MPR resulted from the first democratic election 
since 1955. 
On the other hand, the proponents’ arguments come from the very fact that MPR has not 
really represented their needs, especially since there is no adequate communication between MPR 
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members and their constituencies apart from those who are within the organisational structure of 
political parties. Moreover, the reality that the people elected them in the general election brings a 
consequence that they have to ‘hear’ what the people say—even if they are only a small part of 
the whole people—and not just claim their legitimacy while rejecting the people’s opinion.  
As for the opinion regarding the legal basis of the Constitution Commission, the 
supporters put forward the fact that it is the same constitution that places MPR as a supreme 
body, therefore, so long as there is political will from MPR, it can amend Article 37 regarding the 
amendment and/or assign a Constitution Commission to draft a new constitution and ratify the 
draft afterwards.8 
Another debate surrounding this issue is on the basis that the amendments were drafted in 
a proper way so that there is no need of a new constitution. It is enough that MPR assigned a 
group of experts, invited people to submit the recommendation, and conducted comparative 
studies by visiting foreign countries. 
On the other side, the group which supports the making of a new constitution by a 
Constitution Commission state that participation is not ‘genuine’ and experts do not always 
reflect what the people need. It needs people’s genuine participation to have a constitution that 
reflects the people; and having people’s aspiration is crucial for a country like Indonesia that is in 
the middle of a transition process. Through the involvement of civil society, the trust in the state 
that was lost since the constitutional provisions have been abused by the authorities in 
maintaining their power and repressing the people, can be gradually regained. 
From the CSOs’ viewpoint, indeed, the very large amount of money spent in conducting 
comparative studies—which is believed have been done by experts and can be done through 
document study and the Internet—would be better spent building a system that is transparent and 
open for the people in the whole region.  
In addition, the proponents also point out the weaknesses of the amendments as described 
above. Therefore, there is the need of a new constitution with coherent and clear provisions, 
which at the same time can guarantee human rights, rather than having the original text of 64 
provisions that are amended by the total of 103 provisions and which have resulted in a vague 
system. 
Since this subject was touched upon in a formal speech by a president who is also a leader 
of a majority party within MPR, the issue became more substantial. Some political parties stated 
their support and this topic was even discussed during the 2001 Annual Session of MPR. 
However, because there are some factions that did not agree with this proposal, the campaign and 
advocacy activities of the civil society movement continue and it even becomes more massive. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, I need to re-emphasise that 1998, the year when the New Order regime was 
overthrown, was not the end of the reform. It is, in fact, the beginning of a reform process—a 
transition to a more democratic Indonesia. Therefore, it should have been started with a 
fundamental change: constitutional reform involving civil society. Yet changing ‘the persons in 
power’ seemed to be more important at that time. This resulted in an elite-dominated process of 
reform and, in turn, political conflicts among the elites rather than addressing the needs of the 
civil society. 
                                                 
8 This happened in Thailand’s constitution-making process. There is no doubt that other countries’ experiences in constitutional reform play an 
important role in enriching this debate. Researches studying on constitutional reform experiences have been conducted by both groups in order to 
support their arguments. 
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Although there has been a reform of the 1945 Constitution, it could be said that the 
amendments have failed in bringing about a fundamental reform, that is, constituting clear and 
coherent provisions regarding the political and legal system as well as guaranteeing human rights. 
Indeed, constitutional reform in this sense remains unfinished; and it needs civil society’s 
participation to go through this process.  
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